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"To the rational mind, the existence of a deity is plainly an unbelievable assertion."

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Tuesday 30 March 2010

"...actually, you're an atheist."

'You just can't know, though’; ‘Prove there’s no God’, and 'You have faith as well.' To anyone who calls themselves an atheist, these are pretty familiar statements. We've heard it all in YouTube comments, or forum threads, or conversations with friends; pretty much all of us know someone who finds atheism just as unfounded as theism, identifying strictly as an agnostic. Too often, I can't help but think, we let this characterisation go - what we should say is, 'Actually, you're an atheist too.'

Admittedly, it's a widespread notion that atheism is a standpoint of denial, requiring faith in the certainty of there not being a god. The Charles Moores and Stephen Greens of the world haven't helped by calling it hypocritical to say, as an atheist, that 'There's probably no god.' 'They speak with anger and with certainty', Moore said last year, accusing the so-called New Atheists of fundamentalism , and from the vast majority of the ‘not particularly religious’ people I speak to, it seems as if his position’s a popular one. My very first RE lesson at secondary school, I remember, taught me that a theist believed in God, an atheist believed there was no god and an agnostic didn’t know. My RE teacher doesn’t seem in retrospect to have been particularly unusual, because I find myself on at least a weekly basis faced with the argument that since I call myself an atheist, I must myself have an unevidenced belief in the absence of deities which is just as strong a faith as any theist’s.

This of course is the silly and insubstantial accusation that inspired the flying spaghetti monster, the invisible pink unicorns of Camp Quest and the dragon in Carl Sagan’s garage. To disprove the existence of any of these, we tell the not-particularly-religious person we’re having an argument with, is impossible; but you don’t have to wait until they’re disproven not to believe they exist. All these are sound counter-examples, definitely – but maybe because they spoof the silliness of ‘Atheists have faith’ position so well, I’ve always found them somewhat ineffective rhetorically. Much of their humour is satirical, admittedly – they’re funny because they get the point across so well – but in my experience, all they tend to provoke is a mild chuckle, and perhaps a simmering disapproval at the disrespect of the big-angry-atheist in the room comparing Jehovah to a dragon.

If we want to be a bit more persuasive and a bit less mocking, we might refer to Bertrand Russell’s great celestial teapot. How can we prove, he asked of his critics, that there isn’t a china teapot orbiting the sun between Earth and Mars? It doesn’t take any faith not to believe it exists, because not believing something until it’s proved is the default setting. Quote this, and the person accusing you of holding hypocritical atheistic faith is usually a bit more impressed than they would be by the flying spaghetti monster – there’s no particular logical reason for this of course, but it comes across as a little less antagonistic. Even then though, I find the accusation of denying (rather than just doubting) a god’s existence still remains in the majority of cases. It doesn’t seem just to be a problem with my communicative skills, because I know people who’ve encountered the same reaction. There just seems to be something very counterintuitive about simply not believing an undemonstrated claim being different from asserting the opposite.

I have encountered one analogy with a somewhat better success rate, at least when I’ve used it in conjunction with the teapot or the spaghetti monster. Matt Dillahunty, presenter of The Atheist Experience and counter-apologetics enthusiast, uses the simply an inoffensive example of a coin toss. ‘Supposing I toss a coin’, we tell whoever accuses us of faithfulness, ‘and I tell you it lands on heads. Do you believe I’m telling the truth?’ Without knowing anything about the motives of whoever tosses the coin, we can’t know whether it’s really a heads or a tails result – so asked whether we’re convinced it’s heads, the answer ought to be ‘No.’ But that isn’t the same, as Dillahunty goes on to say, as asserting without any evidence that it must have landed on a tails. Just as with the spaghetti monster and the dragon and the teapot, we have to be agnostic about the coin toss and admit we can’t really know – but until we can know, the claim of a heads result can’t be bought into.

The RE teachers of the world have a lot to answer for, it would seem. To be an atheist is entirely complementary with being an agnostic, as long as you accept that doubt is the default. Agnostic theists, who think we can’t entirely know there’s a god but who nonetheless believe in one, do of course exist; for them, the existence of a deity is simply to be assumed until it’s proven there isn’t one. But this isn’t consistent with the way most of us live in all other cases. We can’t simply assume the Nigerian businessman e-mailing us is telling the truth, purely because we’ve no way of knowing he’s lying; we can’t expect gold at the end of a rainbow, just because we can’t prove there’s none. As far as skepticism’s concerned, deities always seem to be the exception more than the rule.

Nine times out of ten then, the non-committal and not-particularly-religious people who tell us we’re ‘arrogantly certain’ there isn’t a god are missing the point; as long as nobody proves there is one, we’re perfectly justified not to think so, without denying the possibility for a moment. These people are atheists themselves, the vast majority of the time – and if we want to solve the PR problem we have in much of the world, it’s time we started telling them so.

Alex Gabriel
President, Oxford Atheist Society

5 comments:

  1. I always viewed myself as an agnostic, being aware of the difference between "not believing in a god" and "believing there is no god". I recently spoke to Alex; apparently I am an agnostic atheist. This I am comfortable with. I personally think it is important to remember that ones belief as to the existence or not of any god only covers that single god. For example, I am atheist (believe "there is no god") with respect to the Christian God, whereas I am an agnostic atheist with respect to many Hindu deities, whose potential existence I ignore in the same way I do that of FSM. Thank you Alex :)

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  2. Part I:

    I've responded to the first two paragraphs- I don't particularly have the time or inclination to comment comprehensively on the rest at the moment, but from reading the rest of the article, the remarks I have made seem relevant and hopefully provoking. Can I write an article sometime? :P

    //Admittedly, it's a widespread notion that atheism is a standpoint of denial, requiring faith in the certainty of there not being a god. The Charles Moores and Stephen Greens of the world haven't helped by calling it hypocritical to say, as an atheist, that 'There's probably no god.' 'They speak with anger and with certainty', Moore said last year, accusing the so-called New Atheists of fundamentalism , and from the vast majority of the ‘not particularly religious’ people I speak to, it seems as if his position’s a popular one. My very first RE lesson at secondary school, I remember, taught me that a theist believed in God, an atheist believed there was no god and an agnostic didn’t know. My RE teacher doesn’t seem in retrospect to have been particularly unusual, because I find myself on at least a weekly basis faced with the argument that since I call myself an atheist, I must myself have an unevidenced belief in the absence of deities which is just as strong a faith as any theist’s.//

    Perhaps we ought to make clear the distinctions between different types of atheism. Some genuinely are agnostics- they do not hold the belief, ‘it is probable that God exists’ to be true, nor do they hold, ‘it is probable that no God exists’ to be true. Such people are perfectly at liberty to call themselves atheists, even though they reject ‘strong’ atheism. It is, of course, worth noting that, if they are claiming that this is the extent of their religious persuasion, they are also denying strong atheism in the same way that they are denying theism, even if not as forcibly.

    Others will be genuine strong atheists, maintaining that it is probable that no God exists. These are, more clearly, atheists, and ‘atheism’ is an appropriate word to describe their position. It would not be fair to say that atheism can *only* mean the rejection of theism, and that any claims on top of this (i.e. that there is probably no God) are an extension. This is another form of atheism and may be one appropriately described as such, even if using the same word for two similar positions leads to lexical ambiguities. To reject this notion would be to downplay the atheists in history who have held their atheism to mean strong atheism, even though there have been others who have taken it to mean weak atheism/genuine agnosticism. (I wonder if an appeal to the historical use of ‘atheism’ is useful at all- clearly, since the early Christians were called atheists and clearly did not reject theism! Cf. also Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy which defines atheism as the negation/denial of theism). Perhaps we can say that, to be called an atheist, minimalistically, one must reject theism. However, this does not preclude the use of atheism as implying strong atheism.

    As for those theists who maintain that atheists are certain of their beliefs, I can only wonder what is going through their heads (although some atheists do, of course, maintain certainty).

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  3. Part II:

    //This of course is the silly and insubstantial accusation that inspired the flying spaghetti monster, the invisible pink unicorns of Camp Quest and the dragon in Carl Sagan’s garage. To disprove the existence of any of these, we tell the not-particularly-religious person we’re having an argument with, is impossible; but you don’t have to wait until they’re disproven not to believe they exist. All these are sound counter-examples, definitely – but maybe because they spoof the silliness of ‘Atheists have faith’ position so well, I’ve always found them somewhat ineffective rhetorically. Much of their humour is satirical, admittedly – they’re funny because they get the point across so well – but in my experience, all they tend to provoke is a mild chuckle, and perhaps a simmering disapproval at the disrespect of the big-angry-atheist in the room comparing Jehovah to a dragon.//

    I feel that this point would be most effective if restricted to the demonstration of a genuine agnosticism- of course, which is what you have done for the most part. Correct, we do not have an obligation to provide epistemic justification for X’s non existence in order to maintain agnostic atheism. But my problems are twofold:

    a) Some (not all) atheists irresponsibly use this to claim that it is only the theist who claims the burden of epistemic justification. That is not so. Strong atheists (of whom many exist) also share this burden- the only reason that our particular agnostic is not obligated to share epistemic justification for strong atheism is that they are not a strong atheist. Yet clearly the fact that theism requires justification and agnostic atheism does not require justification of strong atheism (though it may require justification of agnostic atheism in some cases) does not imply that the burden of justification for an active position (that is, theism or strong atheism) on God’s existence is on the theist. That burden applies equally to the strong atheist, who must give justification for their active negation of God’s existence- it is only that the weak atheist/agnostic does not share this burden with the strong atheist.
    A related problem is that many who maintain they are weak atheists will still make claims like ‘it is probable that God does not exist’. This is a strong atheistic claim, even if it does not hold claim to certainty. Such a claim must be justified.

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  4. b) I do not think that it is (logically) impossible to disprove the existence of something. One can disprove the existence of some intrinsically contradictory object- a married man who is not married, for example. One can equally demonstrate, as many have tried to do (and yet for some reason still maintain agnosticism), that the idea of a God is an inconsistent notion. While this passage says that to disprove something is impossible, I thought I would also make a point on general epistemic justification for a negative- i.e. one that maintains X’s existence is improbable even if not certain. One may still plausibly have epistemic justification for something’s non-existence. This may be evidence (e.g. P(O|¬T) > P(O|T) where O is an observation and T is theism would constitute some evidence against theism and towards strong atheism. This is done, in practice, by many who yet maintain that evidence to (tend to) prove a negative is impossible), or it may be the claim that P(T) is intrinsically/a priori improbable without regard to evidence. A God who is necessarily singular and who is necessarily completely green is thus (ignoring the possible logical contradiction) a priori improbable. If God is necessarily singular, there may be only one. Yet it is a priori improbable that the one eternal God is one particular colour out of many, and so a God who is *necessarily* green is a priori improbable. Obviously, I know of no theists who maintain that God is necessarily green, but I hope this serves as a useful demonstration.

    It is worth noting also that, precisely because Russell personally thought that some supreme personal creator could not be disproved, he tended to distance himself from atheism when challenged and preferred agnosticism when relating to a philosophically trained audience (cf. for example, “No, I should not say that [that the non-existence of God can be proved]; my position is agnostic.” [Why I am not a Christian and other essays on religion and related subjects, pg 133 (London: Unwin, 1979)]). Yet, at the same time, he claimed that an omnipotent and benevolent creator can be disproved. Heaven only knows the extent to which his teapot analogy is abused today…

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  5. Sounds as if we're mostly in agreement. My point was, precisely, that atheists *need only be* agnostics - there'll likely be a follow up article which details approaches we can take to strong atheism and how it's to be used in argument.

    As for disproving existences, I agree it's entirely possible; but not where gods (or, for that matter, cosmic teapots) are concerned, since as social memes they've been developed as un-disprovable.

    AG

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